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Pension Incentives and Premature Retirement
Abstract
This is a study of people’s retirement timing under defined benefit pension plans (DB plans). The actuarial
structure of DB pensions generally creates strong incentive for people to stay with their employers, at
least to their early retirement ages, not to retire beforehand. Upon tracking respondents covered by DB
plans in the Wave I (1992 cohort) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) until they left their 1992
employers, we found that a significant percentage of people (about 17%) left their jobs prior to their early
retirement ages. Why did people leave prematurely? Several possible hypotheses were considered and
examined. Through simple tabulation analyses, we found that workers in the early-leaving group tend to
have significantly smaller pension benefits and significantly poorer knowledge about their pensions. The
impact of self-reported health status and early retirement windows were not evident. Logistic regressions
showed that conditional on age dummies, pension size, and having basic pension knowledge was
strongly negatively correlated to premature departure. Both excellent and poor health statuses correlate
positively with early departure. Accepting an early-out window also had a significantly positive correlation
with early departure.
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Fei: Pension Incentives and Retirement

1. Introduction
The world is experiencing an unprecedented population aging that will be
profound and enduring. This is especially prominent and serious for developed
countries like the United States. As of 2007, 17.2% of U.S. population was
over 60 years old. 12.4% of the population was over 70 years old. These
figures will increase to 23.8% and 17.7% by 2025, and 26.4% and 20.6% by
2050.1 Older workers who are retired have to rely on cash flows generated by
their cumulated wealth and other members in the society (in form of Social
Security, Medicare etc) for the rest of their lives. By the time of retirement, the
wealth of a typical American household normally includes real estate(s),
financial assets, private pensions and Social Security. How important is
pension among these? There have been estimates that “the wealth equivalents
of pension and Social Security together amount to almost half of the wealth
held by all households. The figure is even higher-over sixty percent-of total
wealth for households who are in the 45th to 55th percentile of wealth
holders.”2 Therefore, pension studies, as an essential part of labor economics
and welfare economics, have become more and more significant.
A pension plan is a legally binding contract having an explicit retirement
objective. There are two broad categories of pensions: public and private.
Most developed countries have public pension plans very similar to the Social
Security program in the United States. Private pension plans include IRA
(Individual Retirement Accounts), Keogh plans (HR10 plans) and
employer-provided pension plans. The focus of this paper is one type of
“employer-provided pension plan: “defined benefit (DB) plan”. 3 A
“traditional” defined benefit plan provides an annuity for an employee upon
that employee's retirement, the size of which is determined by a formula that
usually incorporates the employee's pay (typically the average salary in last
few years), years of employment and age at retirement. The monthly/annual
retirement benefits under DB plans are assured, which means it is the
1

The figures and predictions are from World Population Ageing 2007 by United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
2
See Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1997).
3
Apart from DB plans, defined contribution (DC) plan is another important category of
employer-provided pension plans, which is now the mainstream. Under a DC plan, each
participant has an individual account to which the employee and the employer contribute. The
employee then chooses where to invest. (Usually the employee has multiple investment
options.) DC pensions are mostly portable, i.e., the retirement account can be carried with the
person as he/she moves to a new job. And he/she and the new employer can go on
contributing to it on top of the existed contribution. At the time of retirement, what a person
has in his/her account is his/her retirement benefits. The retirement benefits depend both on
the amount he/she is contributed and on the investment decisions. The employees bear the
investment risks in DC plans. 401(k), 403(b), TSP (Thrift Saving Plans) are typical DC plans.
Besides, there are cash balance plans and hybrid plans provided by some employers.
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employers’ responsibility to make investment decisions with their pension
fund, bear the investment risks, and give their retirees the guaranteed benefits
regularly.
Pensions, just as safety nets in other forms, will alter people’s behavior. In
particular, labor economists have studied how pensions influence retirement
decisions. Defined-benefit pensions have two particular features of interest:
first, most defined benefit pensions tend to exhibit a J-shaped benefit
accruals.4 Here “accrual” is the increment of present value of one’s pension
benefit, from one more year of service in the pension-providing employer.
J-shaped benefit accruals mean that the present value of pension benefits
accumulate very slowly during one’s early years in the company but accelerate
significantly in one’s mid-ages. Second, defined benefit plans normally specify
a “normal retirement age (NR)” and an “early retirement age (ER)”; both of
which depend on years of employment in that firm (“tenure years”), as well as
biological age per se, which differs among individuals in the same plan under
most circumstances5. The “normal retirement age” is the earliest age after
which you can retire and get the assured retirement benefits right away. The
“early retirement age”, which is normally two to five years younger than the
normal retirement age6, is the earliest age you can retire from the job and get a
“reduced annual benefit”. For plans having both NR and ER specifications,
there is usually a huge accrual spike at early retirement age, which means
one’s pension wealth (in present value) will greatly increase if he/she stays one
more year passed that age. There will be a modest increment in pension
accrual from ER to NR and another smaller accrual spike at NR. After NR, the
accrual can sometimes be negative.7 In theory, these features of DB pensions
create strong incentives on people’s retirement timing: on one hand, it
“punishes” the departures prior to ER (in that case one will miss the accrual
spike), deterring some retirement intentions; on the other hand, it doesn’t
provide any financial incentive for people to stay past NR, discouraging the
labor supply of older people. Combining these two effects, one should
naturally expect a “retirement peak” around ER in response to these
4

The reasons why firms want to adopt this “J-shaped” pension design might be multi-fold:
first, the J-shaped accrual pattern has actuarial advantages: the interest discounting becomes
less of a matter as people get closer to retirement age. Also, by heightening the potential loss
of being fired or leaving at young ages, this design can stabilize labor force and can keep
employees from shirking in their jobs for most of their careers etc. See Gustman and
Steinmeier (1988) for more discussion on these. What we are interested in is that this kind of
structure creates incentive against premature departure, as will be mentioned later.
5
There are plans in which ER and/or NR doesn’t depend on when the worker started.
6
ER can be 7 to 10 years before NR.
7
See Table 22 in Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1997) and Fig 2 in Samwick
(1998) for reference.
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structures.8
The data used in this study is Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
longitudinal dataset that has linked pension plans and the people who are
covered by them. HRS combines self-reported data (HRS biennial core
surveys), employer-reported data and Social Security Administration (SSA)
data on pensions and collects extensive information including people’s health
(physical and mental), job and income history, financial status (well-being and
knowledge) and also employment and retirement planning. These features
make HRS a really powerful source for this study.
The study is limited to DB pension holders. Researchers can calculate DB
pension benefits relatively accurately with the help of employer-provided plan
descriptions. Also, because of above-mentioned structures of DB plans, we can
define a benchmark for premature departure, which is the ER9, without much
dispute. On the contrary, in DC plans, the employee’s contribution to the
account is often voluntary and therefore may vary from year to year. Also, a
typical DC plan is portable; the contribution into the account can be carried
over if the person changes jobs. So, to get the cumulated benefits in the
account of a person nearing his/her retirement one has to track the person’s
entire employment history, (which is difficult to do) and the data from past
jobs is of poor quality based on field experience. Moreover, it is hard to define
a clear benchmark for “premature departure” from an employer for DC plan
holders. It is for these reasons we leave DC plans out of the picture for this
study.
We chose workers from the first HRS cohort who were covered by DB
plans on their current job when first interviewed in 1992 and tracked them
until they left their 1992 employers.10 The reasons we used 1992 HRS cohort
are two-fold. First, there was a database created by Bob Peticolas and Tom
Steinmeier in which they calculated ER, NR and present value of pension
benefits at multiple ages for 1992 HRS population with DB pensions. Such
work is very hard to imitate given the time and resource available to the
author. 11 To take advantage of that database, I used 1992 HRS cohort.
Secondly, there was a significant time-span (14 years, from 1992 to 2006) to
8

For DB plans without ER, NR will play the role of ER.
For DB plans that don’t specify an ER, I treat NR as ER. So for the following analyses, the
ER can either mean ER for plans that specify both ER and NR, or NR for those plans without
an ER.
10
For the subjects haven’t retired from their 1992 employers, we track them until 2006 survey,
the latest one available.
11
One has to get access to the restricted data—SSA Administrative data and
employer-provided Summary Pension Descriptions (SPD)—to do this and it involves
sophisticated estimations and imputations.

9
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observe enough “events” within the population, which makes my analysis
more accurate.12
In this study, I intended to find out how well people responded to the
pension incentives and try to find possible factors that might explain
departures prior to ER. One factor that came to mind was the size of the
pension. It is straightforward that the size of the pension can be viewed as a
proxy of its influence on people’s behavior. One should naturally hypothesize
that people with larger pension plans care more about them and may be more
hesitant to miss the “bonus” at ER. As this effect is expected to be stronger
among workers who understand the incentive, I considered the correlation
between pension size and financial knowledge.
Given the importance of pensions for people’s wellbeing after retirement,
one might think that workers should be well-informed about the rules
governing their employer-and government-provided pensions. But often they
are not. Gustman and Steimeier (2000) investigated what workers knew about
their pensions and Social Security. They compared the self-reported social
security, DC and DB pension values to the government/employer reported
figures. They also reported the discrepancies between self-reported and
employer-reported NR and ER. They found an overall “pessimistic” pattern
(people tend to underestimate their benefits) in self-reported variables. Then
they reported positive effects of pension knowledge on accuracy of people’s
retirement expectations (better-informed people are more likely to retire closer
to the ages they said they were planning to do so.). Lusardi and Mitchell (2006)
defined people’s “financial literacy” from three basic questions in 2004 HRS
survey. They found people had poor financial literacy and that financial
literacy was strongly correlated in positive ways with self-reported
“carefulness” of retirement planning and wealth accumulation.
In line with these studies, I hypothesized pension knowledge should be
negatively correlated with the behavior of premature departure: people who
have better knowledge about their pensions would be more aware and respond
to the incentive mechanism implied in the pension structure more sensitively. I
have to emphasize here that the pension information in the PV database
(pension type, NR, ER and pension value at specific ages) were employers’
records or estimations based on SSA data, people’s own reports of earning
history and employers’ Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD), therefore to be
reasonably objective and accurate. I treated them as “real”. People’s answers
12

“Event”, or “failure”, is a term in survival analysis meaning “final outcome of
observations”. Here “events” mean “retirement” and whether or not it happens “before ER”.
Too few “events” always raise doubt about the representativeness and convincingness of the
results.
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to: “What type of pension do you have?”, “What is the earliest age at which
you would be eligible to receive reduced/full retirement benefits?” and “What
amount do you expect to have for retirement benefit?” etc. are what they
“perceived” their pensions would be. I considered those to be people’s pension
knowledge. The idea was to match people’s “self-reported” (i.e.
“self-perceived”) pension information with the actuality and compare across
the two groups (early-leaving vs. non-early-leaving) to see whether the
hypothesis held. I considered two easy pension knowledge indicators in this
study: whether or not one can correctly specify his/her pension type; and, what
is the difference between one’s self-reported ER and/or NR and those shown
in PV database.
Health is a determinant in people’s retirement decisions as it is in many
other aspects of seniors’ lives. HRS collected rich information on respondents’
physical and mental health statuses, using both subjective and objective
measures. Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) showed that the self-rated (subjective)
health measures were not endogenous, so I chose two simple general health
ratings: “How do you feel about your health?” and “How is it compared to two
years ago (last survey)?” and see their influence on retirement behavior.
The fourth factor that might contribute to leaving one’s employer before
ER is the “Early Retirement Window.” Early retirement windows are special
incentives to stimulate retirement at a particular time. Typically, if a firm
wants to downsize, it will make “Early Retirement Window” offers to targeted
employees. Window offer receivers are allowed one to three months to make a
decision whether to accept the offer and leave. Incentives take the forms of
cash bonuses, improvement in or accelerated eligibility for pension benefits,
and health insurance continuation.13 It is possible that these events, occurred
more often since the 1990s, and may have influenced some who would
otherwise retire at or past ER to retire prior to ER because they were allured
by the generosity of the window offer or they feel pessimistic about the
prospect of the firm and would rather jump off the boat earlier. We
hypothesized that receiving, and more importantly, accepting early retirement
window offers would correlate positively to early departures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data source, sample restrictions and definitions of key variables. In Section
3 I investigate the correlation between workers’ pension size, pension
knowledge, self-reported health status and early retirement window offers and
their retirement behavior. Section 4 presents and discusses the results from
13

See Charles Brown (2002) for more information on “early retirement window offers” in
wave 1 to 4 of HRS.
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several logistic regression models. Section 5 concludes.

2. Data
2.1 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The data for this study came from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
database. Initiated at the University of Michigan and mainly sponsored by the
National Institute on Aging, HRS is a nationwide survey project started in
1992. In that year, a nationally representative sample of those who were born
between 1931 and 1941 was interviewed. Over the next six years, younger and
older birth cohorts were added and followed longitudinally.14 Thus, since
1998, HRS staff interview about 22,000 Americans age 50 and older every two
years. The design is to track the respondents until their deaths15, collecting
longitudinal data on physical and mental health, disability, employment status
and job history, housing, financial status (wealth and income), family support
systems and retirement planning among other topics. In 1998 and 2004, new
cohorts targeting population with more recent birth years were added.
An important innovation in HRS is that on top of the survey data, it
collects information about the respondents or the households from other
sources. Putting these different sources together enabled us to know more
about human behavior. For instance, we could get the respondents’ payroll tax
records from the Social Security Administration and compute the benefits for
which they would be eligible when they retired. One can then compare these
calculated values with respondents’ own estimates of their Social Security
benefits. Similarly, one can utilize employer-provided pension descriptions to
estimate respondents’ pension benefits and compare them with self-reported
data. To protect respondents’ confidentiality, such data are available only upon
requests and approvals. Fortunately, information derived from the confidential
pension descriptions was made available without restriction, and this Pension
Present Value Database is used in this study.
2.2 Variables and Sample
I use the “employment” section and the “health” section of the HRS core
datasets, HRS Cross-wave Tracker File (2006) and the 1992 HRS Pension
Present Value database established by Bob Peticolas and Tom Steinmeier for
this study.
2.2.1 Sample Restrictions
14

Older cohorts include those who were born between before 1931. Younger cohorts are
added every five years. The idea is to form a representative sample of Americans aging 50 and
older.
15
In reality, of course there are missing cases (loss of contact), and refusals in later waves.
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I studied only those who were part of the original 1992 HRS cohort, for
the two reasons mentioned in the Introduction. I imposed the following
restrictions to all 1992 HRS population to get the sample for my analysis.
1) The person had to be “currently employed” when first interviewed in
199216;
2) The person’s pension information—pension type, NR and/or ER—for
the “current” job (in 1992) was available in the Pension Present Value
database;
3) His/her birth year and month in the Tracker File was non-missing.
Since the event we tracked is departure from 1992 employers, we wanted
to wipe out those who had been retired in 1992. The first restriction did that.
The second restriction had two data-cleaning functions: first, we only included
those who were shown to be under a DB plan in PV database in our sample.
Also, we required the NR and/or ER information in PV database to be
available. Assuming the NR/ER calculation in PV database to be “actuality”,
we used that information and the birth year and birth month data in the Tracker
File to determine whether one left “early” or not (see 2.2.2 for more). As the
data availability for other variables discussed below varies, the sample size
was not always the same for different parts of the analysis.
2.2.2 Retirement Timing
Firstly we wanted to find people’s actual retirement ages, ER, NR and
then decided whether one left from his/her 1992 employer prior to their ER or
not. Respondents’ birth year and birth month were in HRS Cross-wave Tracker
File (2006). Since we included only people who had a job in 1992 interview,
in subsequent waves, there were always questions under the “employment”
session “Whether you left the employer in the previous wave or not?”, “If so,
when?” We could infer the month and year that the respondent left his or her
1992 employer by taking the first nontrivial figures on “when (you left your
employer in the previous wave)” questions. Then we calculated the retirement
age by taking the difference of retirement year and birth year, adjusting by one
if the retirement month is “smaller” than birth month. For technical purposes
mentioned later, we define “retirement age” to be one’s age at the 2006
interview (the latest interview to date) for those who hadn’t left their Wave 1
employer till by then. We defined “retired” dummy to be one if one had a
non-missing retirement year, zero otherwise. Respondents’ NR and ER data
are available in the Present Value database. By comparing actual retirement
age and ER (or NR, if ER is not available), we generated “early leaving”
16

Given that the SPDs were collected in 1993, only those who were interviewed in 1992
could have been included in the Present Value database.
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dummy being one if one’s “actual” retirement age is smaller than the ER
(he/she left before ER), zero otherwise.
2.2.3 Pension Wealth
We used “Scenario 1”17 calculations in the PV database to be the pension
wealth of individuals at specific ages (in 1992, at ER, NR etc). CPIAUCNS
(Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items) was used to
transform the figures into 2008 dollars.
2.2.4 Pension Knowledge
As previously mentioned, as we had more objective and more accurate
pension information in PV database, we considered the survey data in HRS
cores to be one’s “pension knowledge”. For this study, we only looked at the
two simplest questions asked under the “employment” section of the 1992
survey. One asked the respondent to identify his/her own pension type:
whether “the (retirement) plan is based on a formula involving age, years of
service and salary”—a DB plan—or “money is accumulated in an account for
you”—a DC plan. The other question states “What is the earliest age at which
you could leave this employer and start to receive pension benefits?” We
treated answers to this question as people’s self-perceived ER. We then
compared these indicators of pension knowledge with the data in PV database.
We did this for the early-leaving group and the non-early-leaving group
separately.
2.2.5 Health Status
In every wave respondents were asked “Would you say your health is
excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?” and “Compared to the last wave,
would you say that your health is better, about the same or worse?”18.We
tracked people’s answers to those questions and adopted the answers given in
the last wave before they left their 1992 jobs as “health status factor” that
might influence their retirement decision. For instance, if a person reported he
left his 1992 employer in July 1997, then we took down his answers to the two
17

“Present values of pensions were calculated for nine scenarios, each of which is
compounded using a particular combination of the interest rate, the wage growth rate, and the
inflation rate. Most users will probably want to use values from the first scenario, which uses
the intermediate values for all three rates.”---from the codebook of the Present Value database
constructed by Bob Peticolas and Tom Steinmeier.
18
The self-rating health is of five-point scale, with “1” being the best/most optimistic case
(“excellent”) and “5” being the worst/most pessimistic case (“poor”). The self-rating change
of health is a three-point categorical variable except for Wave 2. (In wave 2 this question is of
of five-point scale. In latter waves, first respondents were asked “better/worse/about the same”.
If the answer is “better”, then ask whether it is “much better”; If the answer is “better”, then
ask whether it is “much better”; if the answer is “worse”, then ask whether it is “much worse”.
It result in three variables on the health change. We could generate a five-pointer out of each
three. But for now, we only consider the first health change question.
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questions in Wave 3 interview conducted in 1996 as the “health status factors”
for that observation. For the people who hadn’t left by the 2006 interview, we
use their health status reported in 2006 interview. The rationale here was that
though health history matters, the “recent health” may affect the retirement
decisions more directly. For people in mid-ages, it is likely that a sudden
decline in health forces premature retirement. For people with chronic diseases,
the last wave health rating can still catch the influence of that on retirement.
2.2.6 Early Retirement Window
In every wave there were specific questions about “Whether the firm
offered early out window since the last wave?” and “Whether you accept it”.
We regard this as an “early retirement window factor”. We wanted to observe
who took these packages and whether that was related to “early leaving”
behavior.

3. Descriptive Results
3.1 Retirement Pattern and Pension Value
Individuals in the sample of this study have birth years ranging from 1930
to 1942. They were entering the age of retirement when Wave I interview took
place in 1992. As previously specified, we selected only the respondents that
were still in the labor force when they were interviewed for the first time to be
in the sample. The pattern of their departure from their 1992 employers since
then is shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1-1 I show the distribution of departure
year. Soon after 1992, the departure peak came in 1995. There were mass
departures between 1995 and 1999. Then the number of departures steadily
decreased. Out of a total of 1592 respondents, there were 490 cases in which
the respondents “hadn’t left their 1992 employer by the last interview in 2006”
or HRS lost contact with this person permanently or temporarily and couldn’t
identify their departure time.
In terms of age when laving 1992 employers, we observed that
“retirements” began to sharply increase from age 55. Age 60 to 62 is the most
“popular” retirement phase. The mass retirements continued until age 65 and
then declined. (See Figure 1-3) This pattern can be properly interpreted using
information in Figure 1-4 and the Social Security eligibility age requirement19:
as one can see in Figure 1-4, one of the three peaks of ERs is age 55, the
increased number of departures at age 55 are probably the response to that.
The big retirement spike at age 60 responds to another ER peak. For most
people in my sample, age 62 is the minimum age at which one would be
eligible for reduced Social Security benefits (the “early retirement age” for
19

See http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm for details.
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Social Security) , resulting in the largest number of “retirement”. The
retirement tides continue to age 65, the “normal retirement age” for Social
Security for most individuals in our sample. There are 503 observations with
missing retirement age.
The distribution of DB pension wealth in the sample was highly uneven
and left-skewed, as shown in Table 2. The median DB pension was about
$81,500 in 1992 (in 2008 dollars), a little more than $100,000 by the time of
ERs. The means were respectively approximately $175,000 and $195,000 at
those times. A good number of people (more than 10%) were shown to have
zero pension benefits in 1992, which meant they would have no pension
benefit if they were to retire in 1992. This was probably due to a change of
jobs. Their 1992 employers were probably new for them at that time and they
hadn’t qualified the “tenure year” requirements set by firms. Size of pension at
ERs ranged from less than $1,000 to more than $1.67 million.
3.2 Pension Wealth and Early Retirement Behavior
The average pension benefits at ER and the increment from 1992 to ER of
the two groups can be seen at Table 3. One can readily find the huge difference
between the two groups: by ER the early-leaving group would get a mean of
approximately 118,000 dollars; on the contrary, the control group would get
approximately 203,000 dollars on average (nearly 80% above that of
early-leaving group). On the other hand, the early leaving group outmatched
the non-early leavers on the increment of pension size from 1992 to ER. The
increment of pension from 1992 to ER is how much more one can get if he
waits until ER to leave the employer instead of leaving the job right away in
1992, therefore it is a more proper measure of incentives. Then it seems a
strange thing that people whose ER spike of pension accruals matter more to
them don’t take it very seriously into their retirement decisions. But this is not
un-understandable. The fact that they don’t respond to ER very sensitively
might not an action out of financial innocence or ignorance. Actually based on
this sample, one can show a positive correlation between one’s pension
knowledge and one’s pension wealth. Their decisions of not taking advantage
of the ER to retire might be because other things that one could get from work
had more weights in their utility functions. An alternative hypothesis would be:
people’s pension wealth and retirement timing might all relate to their
sophistication and personality: a sophisticated, capable person with a
workaholic and/or easygoing personality is more likely to hold a high position,
earning handsome salary and owning more pension benefits. And the sense of
achievement from work, his career ambition and his love of social and work,
among other factors, may make him/her want to work for more years instead
of retiring at ER in his/her fifties. A thorough test of this “capable person tend
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to work past their ER” hypothesis is not easy and remains to be done.
3.3 Pension Knowledge and Early Retirement Behavior
As I discussed above, I linked the pension type and ER, NR information
in the Present Value database with the HRS core dataset. And I regard the
self-reported pension type and ER in HRS core as “self-knowledge”. The
pension type data in the PV database is from employer-provided SPDs and can
be considered accurate and “real”. The ER data is estimation based on the
SPDs, respondent’s earnings and service come from the respondent reports,
therefore more objective and reliable than self-reported ER. So the
“mismatches” of survey data to PV database data is a proxy of “poor
knowledge on one’s own pension”. The results are shown in Table4.
From Table 4-1, we observe that nearly 30% of early leavers gave
incorrect answers to the pension type question, while 15% percent of
non-early leavers made the same mistake. On the whole, early leavers had
poorer knowledge in the most basic question about their pensions. It is no
wonder that they are more prone to disregarding the structure of DB pensions
they have in their retirement planning. From Table 4-2, less than 20% from
each group reported an early retirement age that was exactly the same as
estimated early retirement age from PV database, the percentage of “exact
matches” are comparable across the groups. But the early leaver group tend to
report self-believed ERs that were one to five years too young than the
calculated ERs (23.6%, 10.8% for the control group in this category) whereas
the non-early leavers’ misses were more on the other side. If they would act
based on their self-believed ERs, this result can explain their retirement
pattern to some extents. These two findings verified out hypothesis on the
pension knowledge. We should notice, however, the ER data in PV database is
not absolutely “real” and accurate because it is based on limited knowledge
about respondents and their self-reported job and earning history. Mismatches
in Table 4-2 might also be caused by a wrongly estimated ER in PV database.
3.4 Health and Early Retirement Behavior
It is commonsense that health can affect the length of one’s career and
retirement timing. Here we are interested whether poor health and/or sudden
worsening in health forced some to leave before ER. As a starting point, we
compared respondents’ self-rating health and health change variables (see
Table 5). We can not see any significant results from both variables, either
wave-by-wave or pooled comparison. One thing needed to mention is that we
have about 300 observations in non-early-leaving group with missing values in
health variables.
3.5 Early Retirement Window and Early Retirement Behavior
In Table 6, we summarized the EOW offers and acceptances to two
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groups wave by wave. Most EOW offers and acceptances (over 90%)
happened in the non-early leaving group. The two groups showed no evident
difference in being offered EOW and taking EOW. So from this perspective,
we could not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that EOW had an
influence on people’s premature departure.

4. Logistic Regressions
Logistic regression results are presented in Table 7. We investigate the
influences of factors on retirement timing and premature departure behavior.
First we expand the “subject” dataset to a “subject-year” dataset: one
respondent will have one observation for each year he/she stayed in the dataset
(starting in 1992, ending in the retirement year; if he/she hadn’t retired in 2006
interview, he/she would have (2006-1992=) 15 observations). The dependent
variable for specification I to III is the “retired dummy”: being one for every
observation of the same person if the person had left the 1992 employer by
2006 interview, being zero otherwise. The dependent variable for specification
IV and V is “early-leaving dummy”: being one for every observation of the
same person if the person had left the 1992 employer prior to his/her ER,
being zero otherwise. The age dummies equal to one if the person was at age
in that year and zero otherwise. We include different age dummies for in
different specifications: for specification I to III, we put in age52 to age68; for
specification IV to VI, we exclude “age66”, “ag67” and “age68” because
technically they “predict failure perfectly”. The “atER” dummy equals to
one only if the person retired at his/her ER and only being one for that
retirement year, being zero otherwise. The “pastER” dummy equals to one in
every year after the ER. Besides “pension type knowledge”, “EOW offer” and
“EOW taker” dummies mentioned above, I divided the sample into four
groups according to the size of their pensions and created three dummy
variables for people in the second, third and the top quartile. Two health
dummies are created based on answers to the “current health status” question:
the “health_good” variable is one for every observation of a same person if
that person reported to have “excellent” or “very good” health in the wave just
before leaving 1992 employer, zero otherwise. Similarly, the “health_poor”
variable is one if a person reported to have “fair” or “bad” health in the wave
just before leaving 1992 employer, zero otherwise. Those whose answer were
“good” (the choice in the middle) were the base group. All these factor
variables are time-invariant. (i.e.: the value of factor variables are the same for
difference observations of a same person.)
The column I to III showed results on “retirement” odds. In specification I,
all age dummies have odds ratio greater than one, meaning a person is more
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likely to retire than not at every age. “Age62” and “age65” dummies have
significantly larger odds ratios: we expect to see more than eight times
increase in the odds of retiring at age 62 and more than six times increase in
the odds of retiring at age 65. Age 62 is the “early retirement age” of Social
Security and age 65 is the normal retirement age of Social Security for HRS
cohort. We can see their huge influence there. Specification II adds in “atER”
and “pastER” dummies. We can see conditional on age dummies, being atER
only modestly increase the odds of retirement.20 In specification III, we can
see that “EOW accept” can increase the odds of departure, which is
straightforward. That both the positive rating and the negative rating of health
status increase the odds of departure is interesting. Keep in mind that what
“retirement” really means here is the departure from 1992 employers. One
explanation of that finding may be: while poor health can force people out of
the labor market, having very good health may encourage people move for
new jobs in their fifties.
The column IV to VI showed results on “early retirement” odds. In
specification IV, the only independent variables are age dummies. The “older
ages” tend to have smaller odds ratios, which is straight-forward: as age
increases, the probability of passing the ER increases and retirement before
ER decreases. “Age54” and “age57” have odds ratios that wildly overmatch
others. Specification V and VI add in factor variables. Conditional on age
dummies, pension size correlates with early departures in the expected
directions: being in the bottom quartile by pension wealth increases the odds
of premature departure by nearly 40%, being in the top quartile decreases the
odds of premature departure, but the coefficients are not statistically
significant. Correctly identifying one’s own pension type associated with
much lower odds of premature departure (odds ratio being .418), and the result
is statistically significant. This verifies the strong negative correlation between
one’s pension knowledge and premature departure behavior. Both
“optimistic/positive” and “pessimistic/negative” self-evaluations of health
statuses are correlated with increasing odds of premature retirements. The
positive relation between pessimistic/negative health self-evaluation and the
early leaving odds supports my hypothesis to some extents. We interpret the
positive relation between optimistic health self-evaluation and the early
leaving odds to be: those persons might leave not to retire, but to go to better
jobs. Contrary to the finding in the previous section, where we could not see
impact of early retirement window on early departure, in logistic regressions
20

I am aware that this result may be inconsistent with the theory and some existed studies
based on this dataset. I haven’t been able to interpret this result. However, I have made sure, to
the best of my ability, that there was no easy mechanical mistake there.
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one can clearly see that accepting EOW is strongly positively correlated with
premature departure.

5. Conclusion
The main goal of this study was to find out how well people responded to
the retirement incentives related to DB pension structures and try to identify
possible factors that might explain departures prior to one’s ER. Based on a
sample of nearly 1,600 individuals in HRS 1992 cohort, we observed the
distribution of people’s retirement ages correspond well to ER and NR of
Social Security and DB pensions, something consistent with the theory. The
distribution of people’s pension wealth is highly skewed: the median pension
wealth is about 82,000 dollars (in 2008 dollars) but the average is more than
170,000 dollars.
The non-early-leaving group on average had significantly more lucrative
pension benefits than the early-leaving group. But data on the increment of
pension present value from 1992 to ER—a more proper measure of pension
incentive for staying with the employers—and logistic regression models
don’t support the original hypothesis that people with larger pension plans are
more likely to stay with the employers till ER for the accrual spikes. The fact
that they don’t respond to ER very sensitively doesn’t necessarily indicate
their lack of awareness of their pensions. Instead we propose a more probable
alternative hypothesis: people’s pension wealth and retirement timing might
all relate to their capacity and personality. A person who is more capable and
more passionate on his/her work is more likely to own a bigger pension
package. Also, the sense of achievement from work and a busy business
lifestyle might be more important in his/her utility function than the financial
advantage of retiring around ER, pushing him/her to retire at a later age.
The results from comparative analysis on people’s knowledge on their
pension types and ERs and the logistic regressions showed that one’s basic
knowledge has a strong correlation with the early departure behavior: people
with poor knowledge on their pensions are more prone to leave prior to ER
and miss the accrual spike.
Statistics on overall health self-evaluations don’t show a lot of difference
across the two groups. But results in logistic regressions show that people with
both excellent and poor self-perceived health have higher odds of premature
departure. The latter fit the “poor health force people out” hypothesis. The
story behind the former result might be: people with good health left 1992
employers not to retire, but to go to jobs they liked more. Data on early
retirement windows show that the offer of early retirement windows don’t
seem to influence the retirement timing or whether or not people leave prior to
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ER, but the acceptance of EOW increases the odds of leaving prior to ER
significantly.
Overall, this study shed some lights on understanding retirement before
ER for DB pension holders. Though the prevalence of DB pension is
decreasing, the results of in this study still have implication in the design of
public policy. For instance, “the-more-individual-choice-the-better”
philosophy may not end up giving the less sophisticated people, often in the
lower social economic status, the “seeming” benefits. Maybe more resource
should be allocated to personal finance education etc. This study remains a
very simple one: much work should be done to verify the actual causal chain
in people’s retirement behavior.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Retirement Pattern
Figure 1-1 Distribution of Retirement Year
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Note: 490 observations in our sample had no “Retirement Year” available or hadn’t
retired by 2006. So for this graph, N = 1112. The “weight” is to take account of the
diverse representativeness of different observations. The weight was specified in HRS
Cross-wave Tracker File.

Figure 1-2 Distribution of Retirement Wave
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Note: N = 1112, as it was in Figure 1-1. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-3

Distribution of Retirement Age (weighted percentage)
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Note: 503 observations in our sample had no “Retirement Age” reported. So for this graph,
N = 1111. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-4 Distribution of Early Retirement Age (weighted percentage)
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* N = 1111. The weights applied are the same as in Figure 1-3.

Table 2: DB Pension Size *
Pension Size in 1992
Pension Size at ERs
(in $, in 2008 dollars)
(in $, in 2008 dollars)
0
19,274.86
3,660.21
41,313.97
81,487.77
102,341.8
223,149.4
260,358.2
459,604.6
485,867.3
701,537.4
688,908.8
0
994.83
1,925,301
167,5593
175,594.1
194,534.9
246,555.3
236,516.5
2.600
2.400

Percentile
10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
95%
Min
Max
Mean
s.d.
Skewness

*: The figures are weighted average. We didn’t exclude zero values, N = 1508.

Table 3: Average Pension Benefits Comparison
Pension Value at ER
(in $, 2008 dollars)
Early leavers
Non-early leavers
Mean
Median
s.d.
Skewness
Sample size

117,559.6
64,652.1
122,471
1.511
151

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol6/iss1/4

202,862.8
107,882.3
244279.5
2.320
1357

Pension Increment from 1992 to ER
(in $, 2008 dollars)
Early leavers
Non-early leavers
77,196.2
12,638.2
54,553.9
2,993.5

72,433.1
1.435
151

104,113.4
1.015
1357
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Table 4: Pension Knowledge Comparison
Table 4-1: Pension Type Mismatching
Early leavers
Non-early leavers
No. of people reported DC only
59.8*
204.1*
Percentage
28.2%
15.7%
Sample size
212.3*
1295.7*
*: the figures are not integers because of weighting.
Table 4-2: ER Mismatching
Early leavers
Non-early leavers
% of diff in [-20, -6]
8.87
2.37
% of diff in [-5, -1]
23.63
10.76
% of exact matches
17.9
19.59
% of diff in [1, 5]
15.16
22.57
% of diff in [6, 18]
3.44
22.21
% of self-reported ER missing
31
22.49
Sample size
145.7*
998.3*
*: the figures are not integers because of weighting.
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Table 5: Self-reported Health Status Comparison *

Wave
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Not
retired
Total
Sample
size

Average health status rating
(1: very good; 5: very poor)
Early
Non-Early
Leavers
Leavers
1.56
2.17
(.74)
(.93)
2.48
2.32
(1.14)
(1.08)
2.61
2.62
(.97)
(1.03)
2.43
2.38
(1.04)
(1.02)
2.36
2.40
(1.10)
(0.98)
3
2.69
(--)
(1.02)
2.44
--(1.07)
2.54
--(1.00)
2.35
2.47
(1.07)
(1.03)
133

1037

Average health status change rating
(1: better; 2: almost same; 3: worse)
Non-Early
Early Leavers
Leavers
2.04
2.00
(.52)
(.48)
2.10
2.05
(.59)
(.58)
2.15
2.14
(.56)
(.58)
2.02
2.01
(.42)
(.57)
2.18
2.00
(.72)
(.56)
1
2.04
(--)
(.52)
2.00
--(.59)
2.07
--(.50)
2.05
2.10
(.55)
(.56)
133

1037

* In the parentheses are the standard deviations.
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Table 6: “Early Retirement Window” Comparison
Table 6-1: “EOW” Offers Comparison
Wave
0*
2**
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

No. of EOW
Offers

No. of Offers to
Non-Early
Leavers

No. of Offers to
Early Leavers

% of Offers to
Early Leavers

1103.92
84.66
97.76
100.64
40.82
38.44
24.11
17.65
1508

981.96
80.59
89.64
93.28
39.54
36.08
22.03
17.65
1360.78

121.96
4.07
8.12
7.36
1.28
2.36
2.08
0
147.22

11.05

4.81
8.31
7.31
3.14
6.13
8.62
0.00
9.76

*: Wave 0 counts the number of people that don’t get any EOW offers in any wave.
**Wave 2 counts the number of people got EOW offer(s) between Wave 1 and Wave 2
interview. The figures are not integers because of weighting.

Table 6-2: “EOW” Takers Comparison
Wave

No. of EOW
Offers taken

No. of Offers
taken by Early
Leavers

No. of Offers taken
by Non-early
Leavers

% of Offers
taken by Early
Leavers

0*
2**
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

1324.17
16.47
48.69
57.31
18.21
25.16
12.56
5.42
1508

130.12
0
6.91
7.36
0
1.38
1.46
0
147.22

1,194.06
16.47
41.78
49.96
18.21
23.78
11.10
5.42
1360.78

9.83
0.00
14.19
12.83
0.00
5.47
11.66
0.00
9.76

*: Wave 0 counts the number of people that don’t get any EOW offers in any wave.
**Wave 2 counts the number of people got EOW offer(s) between Wave 1 and Wave 2
interview. The figures are not integers because of weighting.
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Age52
Age53
Age54
Age55
Age60
Age61
Age62
Age63
Age64
Age65
AtER
PastER
Pension_q1
Pension_q4
Pention Type
Health_good
Health_bad
EOW_offer

Table 7: Logistic regressions
Retirement Trend
Early Leaving Factors
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
.49
.58
.41
7.74**
7.43**
7.45**
(.28)
(.33)
(.23)
(7.13)
(6.91)
(6.93)
1.07
1.24
.87
16.73** 15.75** 15.65**
(.38)
(.45)
(.31)
(13.27) (12.78) (12.68)
1.53
1.77
1.27
30.15** 28.71** 28.53**
(.46)
(.53)
(.38)
(22.54) (21.92) (21.75)
3.31** 3.54** 2.64**
19.92** 19.15** 18.97**
(.85)
(.93)
(.69)
(15.21) (14.91) (14.76)
5.42** 5.62** 4.54**
13.87** 13.24** 13.15**
(1.25)
(1.28)
(1.03)
(10.56) (10.21) (10.11)
4.29** 4.33** 3.69**
10.28** 9.98**
9.90**
(1.01)
(1.02)
(.86)
(8.10)
(7.95)
(7.87)
9.98** 9.95** 8.96**
11.23** 11.00** 10.95**
(2.24)
(2.24)
(1.99)
(8.75)
(8.67)
(8.62)
5.35** 5.31** 4.79**
9.27**
9.11**
9.09**
(1.28)
(1.27)
(1.14)
(7.35)
(7.27)
(7.87)
4.45** 4.40** 4.12**
9.61**
9.50**
9.52**
(1.10)
(1.09)
(1.14)
(7.76)
(7.70)
(7.71)
6.64** 6.52** 6.36**
.71
.71
.70
(1.61)
(1.59)
(1.54)
(.86)
(.86)
(.86)
1.21
1.14
------(.21)
(.21)
1.27** 1.25**
------(.13)
(.14)
1.04
1.37
(.08)
(.27)
.93
.81
(.08)
(.19)
.95
.42**
.41**
(.08)
(.08)
(.08)
2.03**
1.95**
1.91**
(.15)
(.38)
(.37)
1.95**
1.64**
1.65**
(.20)
(.45)
(.46)
1.07
.32**
.31**
(.10)
(.12)
(.11)
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EOW_accept
Pseudo R 2

.050

.051

2.58**
(.27)
.081

.046

3.29**
(1.45)
.081

3.25**
(1.45)
.080

The dependent variable for specification I, II and III is the “retired” dummy in a
“subject-year” dataset, being 1 if the observation is a “retired” person (has left his/her 1992
employer by 2006 interview) at the “retirement year”, being 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable for specification IV V and VI is the “early-leaving” dummy in a
“subject-year” dataset, being 1 if the person is an “early leaver” at his/her “retirement year”,
being 0 otherwise.
Odds ratios are reported.
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